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mAbstract
Numerous empirical studies find a substantial extent of discrimination in hiring
decisions. Anonymous job applications have gained attention and popularity to
identify and combat this form of discrimination. To test whether their intended
effects result in practice, in several European countries such as Sweden, France and
the Netherlands field experiments were recently conducted. Also in Germany, a large
field experiment has examined the practicability and potentials of this approach.
Against the background of the recent German findings as novel evidence, this paper
discusses the advantages and disadvantages of this new policy proposal.
JEL codes: M51, J71, J78
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Discrimination is present in many markets around the world. It has, for example, been
documented in a broad range of consumer markets (Yinger, 1998). However, labor market
discrimination has received the most attention, both in the academic literature as well as in
the policy debate. The main focus is on characteristics such as gender, race and ethnicity,
and differences in employment patterns and earnings by these characteristics that cannot
be attributed to other (observable) characteristics. More recently, an emerging strand of the
literature explores the role of “beauty” in determining labor market outcomes. Attributes
such as weight, size or attractiveness appear to matter for a broad range of labor market
outcomes, including earnings, and are also able to explain sorting behavior into different
occupations (see, e.g., Hamermesh and Biddle, 1994; Biddle and Hamermesh, 1998).
A crucial dimension of labor market discrimination is the access to jobs. Unequal access
to employment opportunities across population groups has important implications for the
short- and long-term labor market outcomes of individuals who are affected. Indeed, a
large number of empirical studies document a substantial extent of discrimination in hir-
ing decisions. Examples for such studies that typically use correspondence tests include
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) for the United States, Carlsson and Rooth (2007) for
Sweden, and Kaas and Manger (2012) for Germany. Discrimination in recruitment deci-
sions is a market failure because it should be in the employers’ own interest to hire the
most productive workers—irrespective of their gender, race or ethnicity.
Anonymous job applications gain attention and popularity as an attractive policy inter-
vention to reduce or even eliminate discrimination in hiring. Discrimination becomes im-
possible if applicants’ characteristics which employers may discriminate against are
unknown and it is not possible to deduce these characteristics indirectly. However, the2012 Krause et al.; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
ttribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
edium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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been used in other areas. For example, Blank (1991) analyzes the effects of double-blind
and single-blind reviewing processes at an economic journal. Goldin and Rouse (2000)
investigate the impacts of blind auditions to select members of symphony orchestras.
These experiences show that it is generally possible to decide anonymously.
However, anonymity appears in stark contrast to the zeitgeist. Millions of individuals in-
creasingly use virtual social networks and similar pages on the internet, where they provide
extensive information about themselves—which is moreover often publicly available. The
amount of information goes even beyond the amount that is included in very comprehen-
sive application documents. Similarly, in Asian countries such as South Korea, providing
very detailed and extensive information in application forms is the standard. On the other
hand, there are countries like the United States where applications include much less
information than what is typically the case in European countries. Hence, any discussion
about anonymous job applications is also related to the question of the optimal amount of
information included in application documents.
This paper contributes to the ongoing and lively debate about anonymous job applica-
tions. Can this instrument prevent employers from hiring discrimination? And if so, what
are the related costs? We first summarize the main findings of experiments with anonym-
ous job applications in Europe in Section 2 and present novel empirical results from the
recent German experiment in Section 3. Against this background, we then comprehensively
discuss and analyze the potentials and limits of anonymous job applications in Section 4.
Finally, we conclude in Section 5.2. Recent experiments in European countries
What are the effects of anonymous job applications on the callback rates of minority appli-
cants? To answer this question, a number of field experiments have recently been con-
ducted in European countries, including relatively large-scale experiments in France, the
Netherlands and Sweden.
The French government initiated an experiment in 2010 and 2011 which was implemen-
ted by the French public employment service. It involved about 1,000 firms in eight local
labor markets and it lasted in total for about ten months (Behaghel et al., 2011). The
experiments’ main findings can be summarized as follows. First, women benefit from
higher callback rates with anonymous job applications—at least if they compete with male
applicants for a job. However, for roughly half of the vacancies included in the experiment
only female candidates or only male candidates applied. Second, migrants and residents of
deprived neighborhoods suffer from anonymous job applications. Their callback rates are
lower with anonymous job applications than with standard applications. Third, recruiters
who tend to invite candidates with similar characteristics to them are not able to continue
to do so. This conscious or unconscious behavior of “homophily” is therefore prevented
with anonymous job applications, importantly with persistent effects in later stages of the
recruitment process.
In the Netherlands, two experiments took place in the public administration of one major
Dutch city in 2006 and 2007. The experiments focus on ethnic minorities. More specifically,
a distinction is made between applicants with and without foreign (i.e., non-Western)
sounding names. Bøg and Kranendonk (2011) emphasize in their study the lower callback
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these differences disappear with anonymous job applications. With regards to job offers,
however, the authors do not detect any differences between minority and majority
candidates—irrespective of whether or not their resumes are treated anonymously. This
indicates that even with standard applications, discrimination against minorities in inter-
view invitations disappears at the job offer stage.
Åslund and Nordström Skans (2012) analyze an experiment conducted in parts of the
local administration in the Swedish city of Gothenburg between 2004 and 2006. Based on a
difference-in-differences approach, the authors find that anonymous job applications
increase the chances of an interview invitation for both women and applicants of non-
Western origin when compared to standard applications. These increased chances for mi-
nority candidates in the first stage also translate into a higher job offer arrival rate for
women, but not for migrants.
Next to these relatively large-scale experiments, a smaller-scale experiment provides add-
itional insights on the effects of anonymous job applications. Krause et al. (2012a) analyze a
randomized experiment at a European economic research institution. Data on interview
invitations is empirically analyzed for a particular labor market of economists who apply for
post-doctoral positions. Results indicate that anonymous job applications are in general not
associated with a different invitation probability. However, whereas female applicants have a
higher probability to receive an invitation than male applicants with standard applications,
this difference disappears with anonymous job applications. The underrepresented gender is
thus hurt by anonymous job applications. Small-scale applications of anonymous job
applications can also be found in other countries such as Switzerland and Belgium.
However, these applications have in common that no rigorous empirical evaluations are
available (yet).
The results on the effects of anonymous job applications from experiments in Europe are
therefore in general encouraging. In most cases, anonymous job applications lead to the
desired effect of increasing the interview invitation probabilities of disadvantaged groups.
However, some results point into the direction that anonymity prevents employers from
favoring minority applicants when credentials are equal—at least in the initial stage of the
hiring process. 1 Results from a recent experiment in Germany provide additional insights.
Effects may be different since in Germany, application documents contain a lot of informa-
tion of the applicant. These documents typically include a cover letter and a CV, usually
covering personal characteristics such as the name, contact details, date and place of birth
as well as a picture of the applicant.
3. The German experiment
In early 2010, the publication of a correspondence testing study for Germany (Kaas and
Manger, 2012) triggered a lively public debate about discrimination in the hiring decisions
of German firms. The study finds that applicants with a Turkish-sounding name are on
average 14 percentage points less likely to receive an invitation for a job interview than
applicants with a German-sounding name who are otherwise similar. In small- and
medium-sized firms, this difference is even larger and amounts to 24 percentage points.
Against this background and inspired by experiments in other European countries, the
Federal Anti-Discrimination Agency initiated a field experiment with anonymous job appli-
cations in Germany to investigate their potential in combating hiring discrimination.
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The German experiment officially commenced in November 2010 and lasted for twelve
months in each of the participating organizations (Krause et al., 2012b). In total, eight orga-
nizations voluntarily joined the experiment. Among those organizations were four inter-
national companies, one medium-sized firm, and three public administrations. These
organizations committed themselves to review anonymous job applications in specific
departments for different types of jobs. The vacant jobs included apprentices, students, spe-
cialists as well as management positions. The characteristics that were made anonymous
include the applicant’s name and contact details, gender, nationality, date and place of birth,
disability, marital status and the applicant’s picture. Additionally, any information about pro-
fessional experience should only indicate the duration of employment spells and not their
actual start date or end date. 2 Importantly, applications were treated anonymously only in
the first stage the recruitment process, i.e., when recruiters decide about which candidates
to invite for a job interview. However, as soon as the interview invitations had been sent
out, the candidates’ identity was revealed.
The goal of this project was twofold. First, a qualitative evaluation should shed light on
the practicability of anonymous job applications. For this purpose, structured interviews
with the respective recruiters and a survey among the applicants were conducted. The prac-
ticability of four different methods was examined which are in principal suited to make
sensitive information anonymous:
a) standardized application forms in which sensitive information is not included;
b) refinements of existing online application forms such that sensitive information is
disabled;
c) copying applicant’s non-sensitive information into another document;
d) blackening sensitive information in the original application documents.
Results on practicability are reported in Section 3.2.
As a second goal of the experiment, the effects of anonymous job applications on
interview invitation probabilities should be empirically investigated. The necessary data on
applicants was collected by the participating organizations during the project. To empiric-
ally investigate the effects of anonymous job applications on interview invitation probabil-
ities, we conduct a two-step analysis. In both steps, we apply linear probability models.
First, using data on anonymous job applications only, we analyze whether interview invi-
tation probabilities systematically differ by gender and migration background when these
characteristics are unknown to the recruiters. Our hypothesis is that, if the anonymization
is effective, the applicants’ anonymous characteristics cannot determine the interview
invitation probability. Such influence could only be present in two cases. One possibility is
that recruiters are able to deduce minority group membership status from other character-
istics. Another possibility is that minority group membership status is correlated with other
characteristics such as, for example, educational attainment or professional experience.
Second, to detect possible effects of introducing anonymous job applications, we compare
the situation of anonymous job applications with a counterfactual situation, i.e., a compar-
able situation with standard job applications. Theoretically, three different effects are pos-
sible if we assume that anonymous job applications eliminate any differential treatment of
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probabilities of minority groups to increase and to equalize with those of majority groups.
In this situation, minority groups are discriminated against with standard applications.
Second, if discrimination is not present with standard applications, anonymous job applica-
tions have no effect on interview invitation probabilities. Third, if instruments such as
affirmative action are applied through which minority groups actually benefit from higher
interview invitation probabilities with standard applications, the introduction of anonymous
job applications may cause interview invitation probabilities of minority groups to decrease.
Given that the hiring processes are very heterogeneous (sometimes even within the same
organization) with respect to the type of vacancy, the method that is used to make sensitive
information anonymous and the number of applicants, we conduct our analysis separately
for each hiring process. Results on the effects of anonymous job applications are for one
example recruitment process reported in Section 3.3, and for all processes in Section 3.4.
An overview of all hiring processes is given in Table 1. For nine processes are data on the
anonymous job applications available. Additionally, the organizations provided data on con-
trol groups for seven out of nine processes. The number of applications range from 27 to
over 800 per hiring process which provides some indication for the heterogeneity between
the different processes. Copying non-sensitive information into another document is used
only once as method of anonymization, whereas blackening is the most frequent method.
Certain descriptive statistics of processes 1, 4, 8 and 9 stand out. 93 percent of the appli-
cants in process 1 are female, whereas this applies to only to 2 percent of the applicants in
process 4. Migrants usually make up at least 17 percent of the applicants. However, in
process 8 this number is only 3 percent. Finally, the callback rate in process 9 is 93 percent,
which is unusually high. The organization explains this number with a surprisingly high
incidence of refusals by the candidates, a generally rather less qualified cohort of applicants
and a slow progression of the recruitment process. Most control groups come either from
recruitment processes of similar vacancies in the past (e.g., from the preceding year) or from
hiring processes for similar vacancies, which take place simultaneously to the anonymous
hiring process. Process 7 is an exception in this regard, as in this organization the applicants
were reviewed in the standard way without anonymization which led to interview invita-
tions. These same applications were subsequently anonymously reviewed by other recrui-
ters, which are similar in demographic characteristics and experience to the first recruiter
team according to the organization. This second review represents the control group for
this process, although it did not lead to any interview invitation, but was entirely fictitious.
This situation is difficult, given that the recruiters knew about their fictitious review, and
needs to be taken into account in the empirical analysis.
3.2. Results on practicability
The results of the qualitative evaluation can be summarized as follows. 3 Both, recruiters
and applicants do not report major practical problems in implementing anonymous job
applications. In particular, the use of a standardized application form appears as a very effi-
cient method—at least, once such a form is developed. As a non-negligible side effect, a
standardized application form increases comparability between the applicants. Organiza-
tions which used this method even consider continuing with anonymous job applications
after the experiment. In contrast, in particular the method of blackening the applications is
a very time-consuming and error-prone technique. Irrespective of the implementation
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Table 1 Overview of anonymous job applications in German experiment (Continued)
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tices as well as the stronger focus on qualifications and skills that results with anonymous
job applications. Recruiters regard particularly the removal of the applicant’s picture as a
positive development, since pictures often lead to misleading first impressions in the review-
ing process. Moreover, when hiring anonymously, the organizations can present themselves
as open-minded employers that aim at objective selection processes. Several recruiters rate
this as a benefit for their corporate image.
All applicants who applied via an anonymous standardized application form were asked
to answer a short survey about their experiences with this application method. As only the
candidates who were reviewed with this method actively take notice of the anonymous job
applications, this survey population displays a selection out of all applicants that were part
of the experiment. About 41 percent of the applicants self-evaluate their chances to receive
an interview invitation as higher with anonymous job applications and about 33 percent
rate their chances to be equal between anonymous and non-anonymous hiring methods.
About 48 percent of the respondents generally prefer anonymous job applications over
standard ones, whereas 31 percent prefer the opposite. Moreover, a majority of 44 percent
do not rate the time spent for the application process as being different between anonym-
ous and standard applications, whereas 31 percent claim to need more time for standard
applications. In addition, more than half of the applicants (54 percent) declare that the
potential to present themselves is higher with anonymous job applications or that it is at
least not different from that with standard applications.3.3. Quantitative effects: example recruitment process
We first describe the effects of anonymous job applications for one specific recruitment
process in detail (see Table 1, process 8). We select this process as an example because of a
relatively large sample size and because data on two different control groups are available.
We have information about 809 applicants whose applications were anonymously reviewed
during the experiment. About half of these applicants are female, about 3 percent have a
migration background and their average age is 20 years. The applicants have on average less
than one year of work experience, report less than one previous employer, and completed
two internships. About one third receives an interview invitation as the outcome of the first
stage in this hiring process.
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anonymous job applications in this example. In this first step, we only consider those
candidates whose applications were anonymously reviewed. Both potentially disadvantaged
groups of female applicants and applicants with a migration background have a slightly
higher probability to be invited for interview compared to men and natives, respectively. 4
However, these differences are not statistically significant in column (1). When controlling
for additional characteristics of the applicants such as age, educational attainment and
number of internships in column (2), the coefficient of the female dummy drops and
becomes virtually zero. The coefficient of the migrant dummy slightly increases, but
remains statistically insignificant. In this example, it thus appears that female applicants and
applicants with a migration background do not face systematically different interview invita-
tion probabilities when their applications are anonymously reviewed.
In the second part of our empirical analysis we analyze the effects of introducing anonym-
ous job applications. To compare the situation of anonymous job applications with the
counterfactual situation of standard applications, data for two potential control groups is
available in the example of this specific recruitment process. The first potential control
group consists of applicants who applied for the same vacancy in the previous year using
standard applications. This group would represent an appropriate control group if no other
changes had occurred between the two years besides the fact that applications were an-
onymously reviewed in 2011. The group of applicants in 2010 consists of 1,357 individuals
and is therefore by about 500 applicants larger than in 2011 when applications were
anonymously reviewed. However, there are no significant differences in the shares of female
or migrant applicants, or in the applicants’ average age. In both groups, equal shares of
applicants have completed the general qualification for university entrance or the qualifica-
tion for technical college entrance. Only the number of internships is significantly different
as candidates in 2010 report on average only one internship.
Table 3 displays the results of the comparison between the two recruitment processes in
2010 and 2011. Results in the first row of columns (1) and (2) indicate that the interview
invitation probability is about 6 to 8 percentage points higher for applicants who are
anonymously treated. However, this difference might be related to the different number of
applicants. Fewer individuals applied in 2011 when applications were anonymously
reviewed, which could result in a higher overall share of interview invitations. Results in
columns (1) and (2) moreover show that female applicants are significantly more likely to
be invited for an interview—irrespective of whether they belong to the treatment or control
group. Results in column (3) include, in addition to the treatment dummy and the dummy
variables for the two demographic groups, two interaction terms between these variables.Table 2 Interview invitation probability with anonymous job applications
(1) (2)
Female 0.017 (0.033) 0.008 (0.033)
Migrant 0.089 (0.100) 0.109 (0.101)
Control Variables No Yes
R2 0.001 0.016
Number of Observations 809 809
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.
Linear probability model. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Further control variables in specification (2) are age, age
squared, educational attainment and number of internships.
Table 3 Comparison with standard applications from past recruitment
(1) (2) (3)
(a) Anonymous 0.057*** (0.020) 0.075** (0.035) 0.112*** (0.041)
(b) Female 0.063*** (0.019) 0.060*** (0.019) 0.093*** (0.024)
(c) Migrant −0.013 (0.056) −0.003 (0.057) −0.084 (0.064)
(d) Anonymous x Female −0.086** (0.041)
(e) Anonymous x Migrant 0.192 (0.119)
Control Variables No Yes Yes
Δ: Sum (a) + (d) 0.026 (0.041)
Δ: Sum (a) + (e) 0.305** (0.121)
R2 0.009 0.017 0.020
Number of Observations 2,166 2,166 2,166
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.
Linear probability model. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Further control variables in specifications (2) and (3) are
age, age squared, educational attainment and number of internships.
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indicates that female applicants are about 9 percentage points less likely to receive an inter-
view invitation when their applications are anonymously reviewed. To estimate the causal
effect of anonymous job applications on the interview invitation probability for female appli-
cants compared to female applicants who were recruited with standard applications, we
calculate the sum of the treatment dummy and the interaction term. This overall effect of
anonymous job applications for female applicants is not statistically significant, and hence
we do not find a systematic effect of anonymous job applications for this group. Applicants
with a migration background are more likely to receive an interview invitation with
anonymous job applications as indicated by the coefficient on the interaction term for
migrants. Although this difference is not statistically significant, there is a positive significant
overall effect of anonymous job applications for applicants with a migration background.
With about 30 percentage points this effect is moreover quite substantial. Therefore, the
comparison with this control group reveals no effect of anonymous job applications for
women, but migrants benefit from higher interview invitation rates when applications are
anonymously reviewed.
The second potential control group consists of applicants which are part of the same
cohort of applicants as the treatment group, with the only difference that their applications
were not anonymously reviewed. The treatment group was made artificially smaller since
the organization started to anonymously review applications only after the recruitment
process had already started. This first part of the cohort of applicants in 2011 thus constitu-
tes a second potential control group. It includes 129 individuals and is therefore substan-
tially smaller than the treatment group. However, applicants’ characteristics are similar in
both groups and do not significantly differ. The only exception is the share of individuals
with a migration background, which is 7 percent in the control group and thus exceeds the
respective share in the treatment group by about 4 percentage points.
Table 4 displays the results of the comparison in interview invitation rates between these
two groups. Columns (1) and (2) show that interview invitation probabilities do not signifi-
cantly differ by treatment status, gender and migration background. When additionally
including interaction terms in column (3), we find that female applicants are more likely to
receive an interview invitation with standard applications. Female applicants’ advantage,
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negative overall effect of anonymous job applications for women. More precisely, the
chances of female applicants to be invited for an interview decrease with anonymous job
applications by about 14 percentage points when compared to standard applications. In
contrast to the results from the analysis with the first control group, we do not detect any
significant effects of anonymous job applications for migrants. This could, however, be due
to the smaller sample size of this control group.
The effects of anonymous job applications in this organization can therefore be summar-
ized as follows. First, female applicants and individuals with a migration background have
the same chances to receive an interview invitation with anonymous job applications.
Second, the effects of introducing anonymous job applications differ for female applicants
and applicants with a migration background. The latter group seems to benefit from
anonymous job applications. The interview invitation probability of migrants is significantly
higher when their applications are anonymously reviewed, at least based on the comparison
with the previous year’s recruitment process. This result could be interpreted as the first
type of a causal effect, namely that previously existing discrimination is eliminated. How-
ever, our results indicate the opposite effect for female applicants. At least when we use the
second potential control group in this example, women are significantly less likely to receive
an interview invitation with anonymous job applications than with standard applications.
This could indicate that previous affirmative action to promote the chances of female appli-
cants is not possible anymore when the applicant’s gender is unknown. The effects of
anonymous job applications therefore depend by and large on the initial situation.3.4. Quantitative effects: overview
Including the example of the previously discussed specific recruitment process in one
organization, data are available for a total of nine different recruitment processes that were
part of the German experiment. For most of these processes, data on potential control
groups are also available. Tables 5 and 6 display the results for these recruitment processes
obtained from the same two-step empirical analysis as in case of the previously discussed
specific recruitment process.Table 4 Comparison with standard applications from present recruitment
(1) (2) (3)
(a) Anonymous −0.075 (0.046) −0.071 (0.046) 0.005 (0.064)
(b) Female 0.039 (0.031) 0.028 (0.031) 0.156* (0.085)
(c) Migrant 0.115 (0.086) 0.119 (0.087) 0.160 (0.161)
(d) Anonymous x Female −0.148 (0.091)
(e) Anonymous x Migrant −0.051 (0.190)
Control Variables No Yes Yes
Δ: Sum (a) + (d) −0.144** (0.067)
Δ: Sum (a) + (e) −0.046 (0.189)
R2 0.007 0.018 0.021
Number of Observations 938 938 938
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.
Linear probability model. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Further control variables in specifications (2) and (3) are
age, age squared, educational attainment and number of internships.
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those applicants that were anonymously treated in these recruitment processes. Next to
dummy variables indicating gender and migration background, the regressions include add-
itional control variables depending on data availability. Assuming that sensitive information
was effectively removed from the applications and that we control for relevant qualifications
and skills in our regressions, we expect no significant differences in the interview invitation
probabilities for minority groups. And indeed, this is the case for nearly all recruitment pro-
cedures. Exceptions are three procedures, where female applicants have higher chances to
receive an interview invitation and one case where migrants are less likely to be invited for
an interview. There are, however, plausible explanations for these results. For example, the
share of female applicants in recruitment process 1 is about 93 percent and therefore any
results regarding the applicants’ gender should be interpreted with caution. The positive
effect for female applicants in procedure 3 could be due to omitted variables, i.e., variables
that the recruiters observe, but we do not have information about—such as grades in high
school diplomas. These grades might be on average higher for females than for males in
Germany (see, e.g., BMFSFJ, 2004). A similar argument holds for the negative effect for
migrants, since recruiters might have information about the qualification of the applicants
that we do not have, which can lead to a seemingly lower interview invitation probability.
Table 6 displays the results of the effects of introducing anonymous job applications. The
data on potential control groups stem from either past or simultaneous recruitment pro-
cesses for vacancies that are comparable to the vacancies for which the organizations
anonymously recruited. The results of the empirical analysis can be categorized into the
previously discussed three different effects: a) elimination of discrimination, b) no effect
because no discrimination was present initially, and c) elimination of affirmative action. For
instance, the results for recruitment processes 5 and 6 may be viewed as examples for the
elimination of discrimination against female applicants. Interestingly, the applicants’ average
work experience in these recruitment processes is between 6 and 8 years, which could be a
crucial period in a women’s typical working life. Recruiters might anticipate a possible desire
to have children, which could have a negative effect on their invitation probability if gender
is known. Process 8a may also be viewed as an example for this type of effect of anonymousTable 5 Interview invitation probability anonymous job applications
Female dummy Migrant dummy # Observations
Process 1 0.410*** (0.137) −0.012 (0.150) 27
Process 2 0.030 (0.029) −0.051* (0.029) 593
Process 3 0.114*** (0.040) −0.083 (0.053) 719
Process 4 −0.016 (0.332) −0.006 (0.086) 128
Process 5 0.168 (0.102) 0.016 (0.122) 89
Process 6 −0.007 (0.066) −0.009 (0.062) 179
Process 7 −0.006 (0.069) −0.014 (0.062) 248
Process 8 0.008 (0.033) 0.109 (0.101) 809
Process 9 0.063* (0.037) −0.054 (0.052) 92
Source: Data provided by organizations taking part in German experiment.
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.
Linear probability model. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressions include a female dummy, a migrant dummy
and control variables, including (if available) age, age squared, educational and vocational attainment, number of
previous employers, experience (in years) and number of internships.
Table 6 Interview invitation probabilities in comparison
Process 1 Process 2a Process 2b Process 5 Process 6 Process 7 Process 8a Process 8b Process 9a Process 9b
(a) Anonymous −0.757 (0.503) −0.090*** (0.030) −0.275*** (0.046) −0.016 (0.091) 0.147* (0.079) −0.049 (0.049) 0.112*** (0.041) 0.005 (0.064) 0.457*** (0.101) 0.407*** (0.102)
(b) Female −0.200 (0.500) −0.034 (0.025) −0.058 (0.048) 0.013 (0.035) 0.044 (0.055) 0.082 (0.071) 0.093*** (0.024) 0.156* (0.085) 0.096 (0.111) 0.029 (0.117)
(c) Migrant 0.118 (0.286) −0.039 (0.028) −0.122** (0.050) −0.056*** (0.021) 0.013 (0.062) −0.043 (0.059) −0.084 (0.064) 0.160 (0.161) −0.088 (0.105) 0.091 (0.112)
(d) Anonymous x Female 0.570 (0.526) 0.066* (0.038) 0.099* (0.056) 0.156 (0.101) −0.056 (0.083) −0.064 (0.097) −0.086** (0.041) −0.148 (0.091) −0.022 (0.118) 0.048 (0.126)
(e) Anonymous x Migrant −0.152 (0.326) −0.013 (0.040) 0.072 (0.058) 0.118 (0.118) −0.046 (0.085) 0.039 (0.081) 0.192 (0.119) −0.051 (0.190) 0.019 (0.120) −0.155 (0.124)
Δ: Sum (a) + (d) −0.187 (0.178) −0.024 (0.034) −0.176*** (0.046) 0.140* (0.072) 0.091* (0.050) −0.113 (0.093) 0.026 (0.041) −0.144** (0.067) 0.436*** (0.114) 0.455*** (0.126)
Δ: Sum (a) + (e) −0.909 (0.589) −0.102** (0.041) −0.204*** (0.060) 0.102 (0.121) 0.101 (0.087) −0.009 (0.070) 0.305** (0.121) −0.046 (0.189) 0.476*** (0.103) 0.252** (0.112)
R2 0.3149 0.0383 0.1138 0.1802 0.0449 0.0490 0.0201 0.0206 0.2772 0.2855
# Observations 48 1.545 920 238 340 496 2.166 938 190 155
Source: Data provided by organizations taking part in German experiment.
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.
Linear probability model. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Control variables include (if available) age, age squared, schooling degree, vocational degree, number of previous employers, work experience (in years)
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http://www.izajoels.com/content/1/1/5job applications, but in this case for individuals with a migration background. In contrast,
the recruitment processes 1 and 7 may be viewed as examples for the second type of effects
(“no effect because no discrimination was present initially”). Finally, the recruitment
processes 2 and 8b may be viewed as examples for the last category of causal effects, i.e., a
situation in which affirmative action is no longer possible. This seems to be the case for
migrant applicants in the former recruitment process and for female applicants in the latter
recruitment process. Special cases in our analysis are the recruitment processes 9a and 9b
since in both cases, the interview invitation probability with anonymous job applications
amounts to 93 percent. Hence, virtually all applicants are invited which makes the
interpretation of any effects basically impossible.
We find for most recruitment processes statistically significant differences in the
interview invitation probabilities between anonymous and standard applications for all
applicants. However, the direction of the effect is not consistent. The interview invitation
probability is higher when applicants are anonymously reviewed in some cases, and it is
lower in other cases. These differences are unexpected and it is not clear why such differ-
ences should exist. Possible explanations include a certain lack of familiarity with the new
method, which should disappear after some time. Other factors that may serve as explana-
tions include a different number of applicants or a different number of vacant jobs that are
to be filled in the recruitment processes underlying our treatment and control groups.
Altogether, we find that once applicants are anonymously reviewed, the interview invita-
tion probability is in general not influenced by gender and by migration background. This
confirms our initial hypothesis that when information about minority group membership is
unknown, minority applicants cannot face systematically different interview invitation
probabilities. It furthermore appears that the introduction of anonymous job applications
can lead to a reduction of discrimination—if discrimination is present in the initial situation.
Anonymous job application can also have no effects if no discrimination is present initially,
and they can stop measures such as affirmative action that may have been present before.
In any case, the effects of anonymous job applications depend on the initial situation. 5
There are, however, certain limitations to the analysis of the German experiment that
should be kept in mind when interpreting the empirical results. First, the participating
organizations voluntarily joined the experiment and appear as a positive and non-
representative selection of German firms and administrations. Most of them had already
applied measures such as affirmative action to promote minority groups before joining the
experiment. Second, it was not possible to design the experiment as a truly randomized
experiment. Hence, our evaluation relies on non-experimental evidence from a comparison
with potential control groups. Third, data on these potential control groups were of
relatively poor quality and doubts remain whether they adequately approximate the
counterfactual situation. Fourth, we restrict our analysis on the effects of anonymous job
applications on the interview invitation probabilities for female applicants and applicants
with a migration background. Given the number of observations in the experiment, it is
not possible to investigate effects on job offer rates, and also not if effects result in terms of
other characteristics employers may discriminate against (e.g., age). Due to these limitations
our results should be interpreted with caution and should be viewed as indications of
possible effects.
Nevertheless, the German experiment shows that anonymous job applications can be
practically implemented without excessive costs. Additionally, they can lead to equal
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a positive selection of German firms, it seems moreover plausible to assume that the effects
of anonymous job applications would be even larger in a representative sample of
German firms.4. Potentials and limits of anonymous job applications
Anonymous job applications are based on a very straightforward intuition: Removing
information about characteristics employers may discriminate against should reduce or even
eliminate discrimination. Making a decision about who should be invited for an interview
based on unknown information about minority group membership status becomes
impossible. Discrimination is thus prevented, at least in the initial stage of the recruitment
process. 6
Both, the results of the various European experiments and of the German experiment
predominantly show that anonymous job applications can lead to the desired effect of
increasing the interview invitation probabilities of disadvantaged groups. However, there are
indications for exactly the opposite effect, namely that anonymity prevents employers from
favoring minority applicants. In particular, our analysis of the heterogeneous data from the
German experiment shows that the initial situation is crucial. Three different conditions
can initially exist: discrimination, affirmative action, and equality of opportunity. Not
surprisingly, the effects of anonymous job applications are as heterogeneous as the initial
situation to be changed. This result is in line with findings from the various European
experiments. It often appears that the introduction of anonymous job applications is benefi-
cial for a particular minority group in a given experiment, whereas another minority group
does not benefit to the same extent—although the setting is the same.4.1. The limited scope of anonymous job applications
Any discussion about the potentials and limits of anonymous job applications should
therefore start by asking what their goal and purposes should exactly be. The answer which
is most often given is that anonymous job applications aim at reducing discrimination of
disadvantaged groups in the hiring process, which is sometimes connected with the
objective to increase diversity at the workplace. This goal relies on the assumption that
discrimination is present in the initial situation, and that it is based on characteristics which
are not included in anonymous job applications. Another goal which is often mentioned is
that firms should hire the most productive workers irrespective of personal information and
preferences. This goal also relies on the assumption of discrimination, but in this case it can
arise from two directions as no applicant should either be discriminated or favored, but
solely reviewed and assessed according to his or her skills and qualifications. Although the
two different goals can overlap, they are not necessarily the same.
An example can illustrate this argument. Assume that a firm wants to hire the most
qualified workers and, at the same time, aims at increasing diversity among its employees.
This goal cannot be accomplished if any structural differences exist before individuals enter
the labor market or in their previous labor market experience. For example, is there equal
access for individuals from minority groups to education? How would such differences that
are due to the education system translate into differences in previous labor market
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application documents? Firms cannot hire the most qualified workers and simultaneously
increase diversity if minority groups have on average lower education outcomes. This
example illustrates the limited scope of anonymous job applications. Anonymous job appli-
cations cannot eliminate any form of discrimination. They target at hiring decisions and
shift the focus towards the applicants’ skills and qualifications. However, if discrimination in
other instances leads to differences in this regard, solving this problem is beyond the scope
of anonymous job applications.4.2. Employers’ incentives to hire anonymously
With anonymous job applications, applicants are reviewed only based on objective criteria.
Firms can thus be confident to hire the most productive workers, and they can credibly
signal to do so. Once an efficient method of making applications anonymous is developed
and firms use for example a standardized application form, comparability between appli-
cants increases and, hence, recruiters spent less time with the reviewing process. Another
advantage of anonymous job applications from the employers’ perspective is that the
number and diversity of applicants may increase. Some individuals, in particular those that
are members of minority groups, could be encouraged to apply because they anticipate to
be anonymously reviewed. With standard applications, they might not apply because they
fear to be discriminated against. Finally, if anonymous job applications reach their intended
goal and eliminate discrimination in hiring, this may increase diversity among employees,
which can in turn enhance productivity (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Hoogendoorn and
van Praag, 2012).
However, the method of how applications are made anonymous is crucial, especially
from the employers’ perspective. A suboptimal implementation can be very costly,
time-consuming and error-prone. But even in the case of an optimal implementation, firms
have to change their established hiring routines. This obviously involves a certain amount
of investment. However, these investments can at the same time lead to benefits such as a
more efficient and less time-consuming reviewing process. Firms that are committed to
incorporate affirmative action are prevented from doing so with anonymous job applica-
tions. This argument, however, only holds for the first stage of the hiring process. Firms
can still favor applicants from minority groups in the interviewing stage—given that these
applicants reach this second stage.
Opponents of anonymous job applications often argue that discrimination is not
eliminated, but only postponed to later stages in the hiring process. This might be true if
employers consciously discriminate. Anonymous job applications’ potential would then in-
deed be limited to the initial stage. However, it appears that discrimination is mostly due to
implicit and unconscious behavior (Ziegert and Hanges, 2005). Discrimination is moreover
found to be the strongest in the first stage of the recruitment process, i.e., when employers
decide about interview invitations (Cediey and Foroni, 2008). Therefore, it seems reason-
able to assume that once candidates reach the second stage and a personal interview takes
place, discrimination will not be as relevant anymore. Exposure to prejudiced groups seems
to reduce thinking in stereotypes (Beaman et al., 2009), from which minority applicants
should benefit in the interview stage. Anonymous job applications could thus have
important effects beyond the first stage, e.g., on job offer rates.
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Considering the future perspective of anonymous job applications naturally leads to the
following questions: When do anonymous job applications work? And when do they not
work? It is generally true that the instrument of anonymous job applications only has po-
tential if there is a relevant initial size of discrimination. Additionally, as mentioned before,
one should keep in mind that anonymity shifts the focus towards skills and qualifications.
However, do minority groups have equal access to those? Anonymous job applications are
clearly not a universal remedy to any type of discrimination related to the professional life.
As the method of how applications are made anonymous is crucial, the implementation
of anonymous job applications may be easier—and less costly—in countries where applica-
tions include less information. International differences in this respect are substantial. For
example, Shackleton and Newell (1994) investigate management selection methods in
several European countries and conclude that a country’s culture, tradition and habits
influence the methods of selection in a given company. This suggests first, that (national)
recruitment cultures exist, and second, that it might be difficult to reform these historically
developed cultures. One crucial factor in this regard is the amount of information in appli-
cations that is usually provided by the candidates and the amount of information that is
required by firms. On the one hand, for example in Germany, application documents
contain a lot of information of the applicant. These documents typically include a cover let-
ter and a CV, usually covering personal characteristics such as the name, contact details,
date and place of birth as well as a picture of the applicant. In particular, including a picture
in the application seems to be culturally determined and, for example, specific to German
recruitment habits. Moreover, it can consciously or unconsciously lead to good or bad
impressions of the applicant, which in turn do not necessarily reflect a correct assessment
of the applicant. It may therefore come as no surprise that removing the picture from the
applications during the German experiment led to positive assessments of the recruiters.
Besides a cover letter and a CV, applicants also include copies of the most important
certificates and references. Whereas this practice provides a rather comprehensive
impression of the applicant, standards are different in other countries. For example, the
information that is provided by applicants in the United States is rather limited. Due to a
fear of getting sued for discrimination, most firms do not even ask for detailed personal
characteristics. Suing employers for discrimination is rather common in the United States
and it can thus be seen as part of the recruitment culture. Explicitly asking for a certain
race or gender has been illegal since the 1960s (Darity and Mason, 1998).
Two examples of completely different approaches can be found in Asia. Kuhn and Shen
(2013) study gender discrimination in internet job advertisements in China. They find that
job posts are explicitly targeted at women or men, where the incidence of targeting at one
of the two genders is almost equally likely. Moreover, in line with the findings of hiring
discrimination being less prevalent in high-skilled occupations, gender-targeted job adver-
tisements in China are also much less prevalent in jobs requiring more skills. This might
be connected to the desire to find the best candidate for these jobs, which might get more
difficult when skill requirements rise and the pool of potential candidates becomes smaller.
However, gender preferences and required skills for a specific job do not seem to be related
to each other—which is the case for other characteristics such as age, height and beauty.
For example, when young, tall and attractive workers should be hired, job advertisements
are usually targeted at women. Preferences for older workers lead to job advertisements
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very personal questions, such as having relatives living in North Korea, health status, smok-
ing and drinking habits, height and weight, eyesight, blood type, financial status and home-
ownership (Hlasny, 2011). These examples show that recruitment practices can differ
greatly between countries. An introduction of anonymous job applications would therefore
present either a small and incremental change or a large and fundamental reform
of current recruitment practices. It also implies that proponents and opponents of
anonymous job applications are differently powerful in a discussion about a possible
implementation in different countries.4.4. A mandatory introduction of anonymous job applications?
The previous discussion leads us to two follow-up questions. Does a mandatory country-
wide implementation of anonymous job applications make sense? And are specific laws or
amendments of existing laws needed? The first question is obviously related to our
previous discussion of discrimination being not a uniform phenomenon. For example, dis-
crimination appears lower in high-skilled and more competitive labor markets (Carlsson
and Rooth, 2007; Krause et al., 2012a) and in larger firms (Kaas and Manger, 2012), and
thus the effects of anonymous job applications are limited in such markets. Hence, a
mandatory country-wide implementation of anonymous job applications does not seem de-
sirable. It could nevertheless make sense to introduce anonymous job applications in spe-
cific sectors, industries, firms or occupations. But even then, for certain jobs and
professions, anonymous hiring does not appear as a feasible solution. This includes, for ex-
ample, jobs in the worlds of sports, arts and letters, as well as business leaders. More gener-
ally, recruitment processes in such “superstars jobs” (Rosen, 1981) work differently. It does
not appear realistic that any firm would hire its future CEO based on an anonymous job
application. In addition, the degree of competition in a particular labor market plays an im-
portant role for whether anonymous job application can unfold their full potential. For
example, if the number of applicants for a vacant job is relatively low and virtually every ap-
plicant is invited for an interview, an anonymous reviewing process is clearly not needed.
So far and to the best of our knowledge, no mandatory legislation enforcing anonymous
job applications on a country-wide level has been introduced. One noticeable exception is
a law that has been passed in France in 2006 which made anonymous job applications
mandatory for firms with more than 50 employees—at least in principle. As the law lacks
more detailed conditions for its range of coverage and no sanctions are applied in case of
noncompliance, the legislation has basically no practical importance (Behaghel et al., 2011).
It is nevertheless interesting that from time to time laws are proposed that would introduce
anonymous job applications, even in countries where applications already include only a
relatively small amount of personal information. For example, Hausman (2012) proposes
anonymous hiring to be introduced in the United States. His concrete policy proposal goes
even beyond the standard approach as selection interviews should also be eliminated.
Interestingly, rather than applying sanctions in case of noncompliance, incentives for firms
to hire anonymously shall be provided. These incentives could take, for example, the form
of reduced liability insurance premiums. Another proposal of an amendment regarding an-
onymous resumes was made by the Liberal Democrats in the United Kingdom in 2009.
However, the proposal was rejected by the parliament.
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Anonymous job applications appear as an attractive policy instrument to combat hiring
discrimination. Nevertheless, they are very controversially discussed in the public debate.
Our paper backs this discussion by reconsidering the available empirical evidence from
field experiments testing anonymous job applications in Europe. Against this background,
we discuss the potentials and limits of this approach. We particularly focus on novel
evidence from an experiment organized by the German Federal Anti-Discrimination
Agency. Results show that anonymous job applications can be practically implemented, but
they also show that the method of implementation is crucial. Standardized application
forms which are completed by the applicants appear as the most effective and efficient way
to make applications anonymous. Results show moreover that with anonymous job appli-
cations, all applicant groups have the expected equal chances to receive an interview
invitation in nearly all recruitment processes. When analyzing the effects of introducing an-
onymous job applications, we find that anonymous hiring can reduce discrimination—if
discrimination is present beforehand. Anonymous hiring can also have no effects if no
discrimination exists initially, and it can even prevent the employer from applying mea-
sures such as affirmative action, at least in the first stage of the hiring process.
Any discussion about anonymous job application should therefore be based on the prem-
ise that their effects crucially depend on the initial situation in the respective organization.
Policymakers, recruiters and applicants should bear in mind that anonymous hiring could
make sense in a specific sector or in a certain job, whereas it might not be appropriate in
another. Moreover, anonymous job applications specifically target at the initial stage of the
recruitment process. Any preexisting structural differences, and discrimination that is
based on such differences, can therefore not be overcome. Besides, context-specific infor-
mation may be interpreted differently if information about the identity of the candidate is
not available—and this can result in disadvantages for the applicant. For example, if
recruiters are not aware of the applicant’s family situation, migration background or disad-
vantaged neighborhood, this information cannot be taken into account to explain, e.g.,
below-average education outcomes, labor market experience or language skills.
Anonymous job applications may, however, eliminate important productivity potentials
for companies and society. The more standardized application forms will be, the less
chances creative individuals will have to expose their productive credentials. Avoided is also
potential economically productive discrimination that would rely on the power of the
positively discriminated factor. If diversity of workers leads to innovations and larger prod-
uctivity, the creation of those external effects should be wanted. At the end, any hiring is
discrimination, e.g., selecting the good instead of the poor candidate.
The debate about anonymous job applications also shows an interesting trend in the
policy approach towards it. Many European countries have conducted field experiments to
thoroughly evaluate their actual effects. This new approach towards evidence-based policy-
making should be used more often, also with respect to other possible reforms or amend-
ments of existing laws. Nevertheless, its potentials with respect to anonymous hiring have
not yet been completely utilized. For example, the empirical evidence on effects on job
offer rates is still relatively scarce. Until now, to the best of our knowledge no reform or
law exists which makes anonymous job applications mandatory with all necessary condi-
tions. However, from our point of view this step is not necessary. It should be in the firms’
own interest to hire discrimination-free, and with anonymous job applications, firms could
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experiment voluntarily continue to hire anonymously after the experiment ended.
What is the long-term perspective of anonymous job applications? This question leads to
several related questions. For example, when labor markets continue to become more inte-
grated and global, do application cultures inevitably converge? And if so, does a “globalized
application culture” automatically move towards the United States’ equilibrium with appli-
cations that contain little personal information? The current debate about anonymous job
applications could initiate a change, or at least reconsideration, of existing recruitment
practices. Whether or not this process will ultimately result in the introduction of
anonymous job applications is not clear. It may be the case that applications will be
designed that focus more strongly on the applicants’ skills and qualifications. In any case,
with an increasing global competition for talents and skilled workers, discrimination may
automatically become less severe in the future. Reconsidering established recruitment
cultures may nevertheless help achieving the goal of discrimination-free hiring even
sooner.Endnotes
1. If, for example, gender or ethnicity were a signal of labor costs, higher callback rates
may be resulting from an employers’ perception of cheaper labor costs for minority work-
ers. In this case, higher callback rates of minority workers in the initial situation may be
due to lower expected wages, and not due to affirmative action. Although it appears
unlikely that such a mechanism is present, we cannot rule out that it is the case.
2. This procedure should ensure that the risk of deducing minority group membership
status (and age) from other characteristics is minimized in the experiment.
3. The qualitative evaluation was conducted by the Kooperationsstelle Wissenschaft und
Arbeitswelt an der Europa-Universität Viadrina (KOWA). Krause et al. (2012b) discuss the
results in more detail.
4. Since the variation in the applicants’ age is relatively small within the hiring processes
in the experiment, our analysis solely focuses on effects by gender and migration
background.
5. We do not detect any systematic pattern in our results regarding the different methods
of anonymization.
6. It may also be the case that applications are not completely anonymous, e.g., if certain
information such as episodes of maternity leave or military service allow drawing indirect
conclusions on minority group membership. Although this risk has been minimized in the
German experiment, one should in general be aware of this possibility.
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